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ABSTRACT
This study adopted the slippery slope framework in the context of tax compliance in Malaysia tax. Thus, the research 
objective is to examine the effect of slippery slope factors on tax compliance. The slippery slope consists of power and 
trust. Power is distinguished between legitimate power and coercive power. Power and trust have different influence on 
tax compliance. Trust is perceived to influence voluntary tax compliance and power influences enforced tax compliance. 
Survey method is used to collect data involving individual taxpayers as respondents. The findings suggest that only trust 
has significant effect on tax compliance. Meanwhile, neither legitimate power nor coercive power could influence tax 
compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION
In tax compliance research, studies on deterrence effect 
which mainly apply economic model have failed to explain 
the cooperation between tax compliance and tax authority 
(Murphy 2008). There are few researches which found 
out that deterrence effect such as tax audit and penalty on 
tax compliance are still questionable (Andreoni, Errard 
& Feinstein 1998; Bergman & Nevarez 2006; Kirchler 
2007). According to Kasipillai and Hijattulah (2006), 
non-compliance strategy using enforcement like penalty 
and audit are inadequate and it is a necessity to identify 
other factors that may influence tax compliance. A study 
by Andreoni et al. (1998) examined tax audits have weak 
effect on tax compliance. Thus, they suggested study 
on deterrence effect will be more effective considering 
psychology factors such as moral, psychology and social 
because economic model does not measure the level of 
actual tax compliance.
 Thus, by combining economics and psychology 
model, Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 
(2008) developed slippery slope framework to determine 
the relationship between taxpayers and tax authority. 
This framework highlights power and trust as factors that 
may influence tax compliance behavior. Power refers to 
the power of tax authority to control taxpayers’ behavior 
through enforcement such as penalty and tax audit. There 
are two types of power which are legitimate power and 
coercive power (Turner 2005; Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, 
& Schabmann 2013). Meanwhile, trust is referring to the 
relationship between taxpayers and tax authority based on 
trust. If taxpayers have a high level of trust on tax authority, 
compliance is perceived to increase (Kastlunger et al. 
2013).
 Power and trust could influence tax compliance per 
studies conducted by Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 
(2010) and Kastlunger et al. (2013). Findings from these 
studies suggested that high trust on tax authority and power 
would enhance tax compliance. Kirchler (2007) classified 
trust and power as factors that have positive and significant 
relationship to improve tax compliance. He distinguished 
tax compliance into voluntary tax compliance and enforced 
tax compliance. Each of these compliances are assumed 
to be influenced by different factors. Trust of taxpayers 
toward the tax authorities is perceived to influence 
voluntary tax compliance whereas powers held by the tax 
authorities affects enforced tax compliance.
 It is known that most studies on slippery slope have 
been carried out in European countries such as Italy, Russia, 
Austria and Czech Republic. However, there was one study 
on slippery slope conducted by Mas’ud, Abd Manaf and 
Saad (2015) in African countries. Meanwhile in Malaysia, 
Bukhari (2010) applied this framework in her study that 
focused on the effect of trust on voluntary tax compliance. 
Hence, Kastlunger et al. (2013) proposed that slippery 
slope should be conducted outside Europe which have 
different socio-cultural demographic. Therefore, this study 
will use slippery slope to fill the gap and conduct a study 
outside Europe to examine the behavior of tax compliance 
in Asian countries, especially in Malaysia.
SLIPPERY SLOPE FRAMEWORK
Slippery slope framework was first introduced by Erich 
Kirchler in his book entitled “The Economic Psychology 
of Tax Behaviour” in 2007. The book presents the 
fundamental of the slippery slope framework as he 
discussed the slippery slope theoretically. Basically, the 
framework starts from an antagonistic and synergistic 
perception. Antagonists lead to mistrust in the relationship 
between taxpayers and tax authorities, known as the ‘cops 
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and robbers’. Tax authorities felt that taxpayers are always 
trying to evade from paying tax and tax authority will find 
a way to punish them.
 From synergies, another relationship is created called 
as ‘service and customers’. Taxpayers and tax authority 
work together and trust each other. The tax authorities put 
their trust on taxpayers to pay taxes honestly. Taxpayers 
feel the tax authorities treat them with courtesy and respect 
and this treatment makes taxpayers voluntarily pay taxes 
(Kirchler et al. 2008). Tax authorities would see themselves 
as service providers and more likely to seek cooperation 
from the public (Murphy 2008). 
 Based on slippery slope framework, tax authorities 
secure cooperation from taxpayers through two different 
factors, namely, power and trust. Power emphasizes on the 
power of tax authorities to control the behavior of taxpayers 
to increase tax compliance by using deterrence approach 
such as audits and penalties. Trust also emphasizes on the 
relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities with 
more courtesy and considerate approach.
 The term slippery slope is used to illustrate the 
potential interaction between trust and power (Kirchler 
2007). Basically, the slippery slope will interact the 
relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities to 
improve tax compliance. Figure 1 shows the slippery 
slope framework originally developed by Kirchler (2007). 
Referring to the figure, the front part of the framework 
indicates trust on tax authorities is at a low level and the 
power of tax authorities is weak. In this situation, taxpayer 
will try to maximize the utilities and evade tax resulting in 
low levels of compliance. At the top left of the framework 
associated with the power of tax authorities with low level 
of trust, compliance is still increasing due to the power 
of tax authorities enforcing tax audit, the probability of 
detection and penalties. Thus, taxpayers have less chance 
to evade paying taxes because the power will enhance 
enforced tax compliances.
 At the top right of the framework, we can see that trust 
on tax authorities at the maximum level with low power. 
At this stage, the high level of trust enhances voluntary tax 
compliance. Therefore, the level of compliance will be at 
high level when the power of tax authorities and trust are 
high.
 In addition to the power and trust that could affect 
compliance, slippery slope also assumes power and 
trust do influence each other. This relationship is known 
as dynamic relationship (Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai & 
Kirchler 2012). Per Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2010), 
too frequent tax audits and penalties will affect taxpayers’ 
compliance who have high level of trust towards tax 
authorities. However, no enforcement will lead to mistrust 
by taxpayers with the efficiency of tax authorities in 
carrying out their work. Taxpayers who have a level of 
trust towards tax authorities may be able to help increase 
the power of tax authorities as whistleblower in cases of 
tax evasion.
 Meanwhile, Turner (2005) divided the power to 
legitimate power and coercive power. Legitimacy of 
power refers to the power of the authorities in which 
individuals willingly cooperate. In contrast, coercive 
power refers to attempts by the authorities to the people 
who are not adhering the law by using coercive means. 
Thus, when taxpayer has the impression that the power 
of tax authorities is legitimate, level of their confidence 
in tax authorities is also high. In short, the framework 
‘slippery slope’ is to shed light on the behavior of tax 
compliance by reviewing the various effects of different 
factors that can affect compliance.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON SLIPPERY SLOPE
As far as it is known, there are five empirical studies 
conducted in Europe and one in Africa on slippery slope 
using different research methods on different subjects. 
Only one study in Malaysia applied slippery slope 
which was a study conducted by Bukhari (2010). Wahl 
et al. (2010) is the first empirical study carried out using 
slippery slope to examine the effect of trust and power 
over tax payments. The study used laboratory and online 
experiments conducted on students and self-employed 
individuals. However, both experiments did not test 
Source: Kirchler et al. (2008): p. 212 
FIGURE 1. Slippery slope framework
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the actual tax behavior and implications on the actual 
compliance behavior. Moreover, the impact of trust 
and power on compliance either voluntary or enforced 
compliance are quite similar for both experiments. Thus, 
the studies suggested future research of which is to apply 
other methods measuring and distinguishing between 
voluntary compliance and enforced compliance.
 Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pantya, Belianin, and 
Kirchler (2013) used an experiment on students with 
scenarios adapted from Wahl et al. (2010). However, the 
study aims to examine whether there are differences in 
the effects of slippery slope on tax compliance in different 
countries which also have different economic conditions. 
There are differences in the findings by Kogler et al. (2013) 
from Wahl et al. (2010) even though the same methods 
and scenarios were used. Wahl et al. (2010) found that if 
trust and power are at a low level it would increase tax 
evasion. In contrast, a study by Kogler et al. (2013) found 
no such effect. This is because the respondents in Kogler 
at al. (2013) study are students of Economics and Business 
who do not have experience paying taxes as compared to 
self-employed individuals.
 M e a n w h i l e  M u e h l b a c h e r ,  K i r c h l e r  a n d 
Schwarzenberger (2011) and Kastlunger et al. (2013) 
used different questionnaires to test the effect of slippery 
slope. Muelbacher et al. (2011) adapted the questionnaire 
developed by Hartner, Rechberger, and Kirchler, (2009). 
However, the questionnaires which were originally in 
German was translated into English and Czech would 
probably affect the understanding of the questions. 
Kastlunger et al. (2013) used a questionnaire adapted 
from Tax Compliance Inventory introduced by Kirchler 
and Wahl (2010). The questions specifically measure 
the slippery slope. In addition, a study by Kastlunger et 
al. (2013) also differentiated power into coercive power 
and legitimate power which was not reviewed by Wahl et 
al. (2010), Muelbacher and Kirchler (2010), and Kogler 
et al. (2013). The results supported findings from other 
researchers in which trust and power could influence 
voluntary tax compliance and enforced tax compliance 
respectively. Specifically, trust and legitimate power relate 
to voluntary compliance. Legitimate power and coercive 
power are associated with enforced tax compliance. In 
addition, trust and power do have influence on each other. 
 Meanwhile, Mas’ud et al. (2015) adapted cross-
country data for 37 sub-Saharan African countries to test 
the association between trust and power on tax compliance 
without looking at different types of compliance. The 
results revealed that there is relationship between trust 
and power with tax compliance in which the relationship 
between power and tax compliance is stronger than 
the relationship between trust and tax compliance. As 
mentioned earlier, one unpublished study on slippery 
slope was conducted in Malaysia by Bukhari (2010). 
However, her study did not ascertain the effect of power 
on enforced tax compliance. The results proved that trust 
could influence voluntary tax compliance. Therefore, this 
study will determine the relationship between trust with 
voluntary tax compliance and the relationship between 
power (i.e legitimate power and coercive power) and 
enforced tax compliance in Malaysia. This study will adapt 
slippery slope framework used by Kastlunger et al. (2013) 
that led to the establishment of the following hypotheses:
H1:  Trust has a significant relationship with voluntary tax 
compliance.
H2:  Legitimate power has a significant relationship with 
voluntary tax compliance.
H3:  Legitimate power has a significant relationship with 
enforced tax compliance.
H4:  Coercive power has a significant relationship with 
enforced tax compliance.
H5:  Trust has a significant relationship with legitimate 
power.
H6:  Coercive power has a significant relationship with 
legitimate power.
H7:  Coercive power has a significant relationship with 
trust.
METHODOLOGY
This study applied quantitative approach using 
questionnaire to obtain respondents’ perception on power 
and trust in Malaysian tax system. Questionnaires were 
distributed randomly to the selected respondents. The 
respondents comprise of academicians who are teaching 
in the public and private higher institutions in Klang 
Valley (Selangor and Kuala Lumpur) since it is the most 
highly located public and private higher institutions and 
they were selected using cluster sampling method. Then, 
convenience sampling method was used to determine the 
actual number of respondents. The academicians were 
selected as they are salaried taxpayers in the individuals’ 
taxpayers group and they need to file in tax return forms 
by themselves without assistance from the IRB or tax 
agent. They may be less skilled in filing in tax forms 
and that will lead to non-compliance (Loo & Ho 2005). 
Besides, there are fewer study on tax compliance which 
focuses on academicians, thus this study is intended to 
obtain responses and views from this group.
 The questionnaire used in this study contains 
statements to measure each of the variables adapted from 
previous studies about slippery slope and tax compliance 
which has been used by Kirchler and Wahl (2010) and 
Kastlunger et al. (2013). However, the questions have 
been amended according to situation in Malaysia. 
Variables in respondents’ perception is measured using 
a Likert scale to determine the level of agreement to 
a statement given (5 point Likert scale, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = unsure, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree).
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FINDINGS
BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS
From 1,669 questionnaires which were distributed, 
only 241 are usable for data analysis. Table 1 shows 
the descriptive data of the respondents. From the total, 
90 (37.3%) respondents were male and 151 (62.7%) 
were female. The respondents comprise of 152 lecturers 
(63.1%), 47 senior lecturers (19.5%), 23 professors (9.5%), 
17 associate professors (7.1%) and two assistant lecturers 
(0.8%). 146 respondents have more than ten years teaching 
experience (60.6%), 52 respondents with five to nine years 
teaching experience (21.6%), 35 respondents with one 
to four years of teaching experience (17.8%) and eight 
respondents teached less than one year (3.3%).
with score below 0.5. Those constructs are the enforced 
tax compliance (0.496), legitimate power (0.431) and 
coercive force (0.416). However, according to Fornell 
and Larcker (1981), this value is still acceptable as long 
as the CR value exceeds 0.6. Liu, Wub, Yehc, and Chen 
(2015) in their study also accepted the AVE exceeding 0.4. 
For the reliability test, the value of the CR need to have a 
TABLE 1. Descriptive data
Respondents 
(n=241)
Percentage 
Gender
 Male
 Female
90
151
37.3
62.7
Academic position
 Professor
 Associate Professor
 Senior Lecturer
 Lecturer
 Assistant Lecturer/Tutor
23
17
47
152
2
9.5
7.1
19.5
63.1
0.8
Teaching experience
 < 1 year
 1 – 4 years
 5 – 9 years
 > 10 years
8
35
52
146
3.3
14.5
21.6
60.6
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (CFA)
CFA was conducted in order to validate the model before 
modeling the interrelationship in a structural equation 
model (SEM). CFA would assess the unidimensional, 
validity and reliability of the constructs. Unidimensional 
is achieved if every item used for each construct have the 
minimum standardized factor loading. Low standardized 
loading values need to be removed in order to achieve the 
validity and reliability of each construct. Table 2 indicates 
the standardized loading values for each items in the 
constructs. Five items with low standardized loading of 
0.5 have to be deleted as suggested by Hair et al. (2010) 
and Awang (2015).
 Next is to test the validity and the reliability of 
constructs. Table 3 summarizes the validity and the 
reliability of the constructs. Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE) represents the convergent validity and Composite 
Reliability (CR) indicates the reliability and internal 
consistency of the constructs. The value of AVE must 
exceed 0.5. From Table 3, we can see that there are three 
constructs which failed to meet the minimum requirement 
TABLE 2. Standardized loading for each item
Construct Item Standardized 
loading
Voluntary compliance PS1
PS2
PS3
PS4
PS5
PS6
PS7
PS8
0.564
0.681
0.660
0.740
0.827
0.844
0.629
deleted
Enforced compliance 
 
PK1
PK2
PK3
PK4
PK5
PK6
PK7
0.700
0.720
0.812
0.730
0.622
deleted
0.623
Trust TR1
TR2
TR3
TR4
TR5
TR6
TR7
TR8
0.737
0.798
0.735
0.866
0.605
0.754
0.835
0.880
Legitimate power LP1
LP2
LP3
LP4
LP5
LP6
deleted
0.600
0.541
0.641
0.714
0.800
Coercive power
 
CP1
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
deleted
0.600
0.647
0.610
0.661
0.700
deleted
TABLE 3. Validity and reliability test for the constructs
Construct AVE 
(min 0.4)
CR 
(min 0.6)
Voluntary tax compliance
Enforced tax compliance
Trust
Legitimate power
Coercive power
0.508
0.496
0.610
0.441
0.416
0.844
0.854
0.925
0.796
0.685
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minimum value of 0.6. Referring to the same table, the CR 
for all constructs exceeded the value of 0.6.
 In addition to the above tests, fitness of the measurement 
model must be evaluated. Table 4 shows fitness indexes 
for the model and all required levels are achieved. 
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL (SEM)
After the CFA was administered, the next step is to model 
the constructs into SEM for analysis. Table 5 represents 
the regression path coefficient in the relationship between 
slippery slope and tax compliances. The results show 
that only trust has a significant relationship with the 
voluntary compliance with p = 0.007 with the estimate of 
the regression coefficient (beta) = 0.304 which indicates 
that when trust goes up by 1, voluntary tax compliance 
goes up by 0.304. This means voluntary tax compliance 
is influenced positively by taxpayers’ perceptions of 
trust on the tax authorities. In contrast, no slippery slope 
factors could influence enforced tax compliance and this 
is contrary from previous studies. 
 Finally, results for the dynamic relationship between 
slippery slope factors is shown in Table 6. The findings 
show that legitimate power has significant relationship with 
(p = 0.000 and the estimate of the regression coefficient = 
0.499) and coercive power (p = 0.000 and the estimate of 
the regression coefficient = 0.644), whereas the coercive 
power does not have a relationship with trust as expected 
(p = 0.853). This value indicates when coercive power and 
trust go up by 1, the legitimate power goes up by 0.644 
and 0.499. 
 The findings from the analysis can be concluded that 
three hypotheses were supported. Those hypotheses are 
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 5, and Hypothesis 6 as shown 
in Table 7. 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
Slippery slope framework expects that the voluntary tax 
compliance will be influenced by trust and legitimate 
power, meanwhile the enforced tax compliance is 
TABLE 4. Fitness index for each construct in the model
Construct
Absolute fit 
RMSEA*
Incremental fit
CFI**
Parsimonious fit
Chi-Square/df***
Tax compliance
Slippery slope
0.054
0.079
0.968
0.918
1.655
2.395
* < 0.08
** > 0.90
*** < 3.0
TABLE 5. Regression path coefficient – slippery slope and compliance
Constructs Estimate of 
regression coefficient
Standard error Critical value p
VC
VC
EC
EC
<---
<---
<---
<---
TR
LP
LP
CP
0.304
-0.068
0.151
0.212
0.070
0.067
0.165
0.165
2.693
-0.811
1.206
1.626
0.007*
0.418
0.228
0.104
*significant value at p<0.05
Note: VC = voluntary tax compliance
 EC = enforced tax compliance
 TR = trust
 LP = legitimate power
 CP = coercive power
TABLE 6. Regression path coefficient – the dynamic relationship
Constructs Estimate of regression 
coefficient
Standard error Critical value p
CP
LP
LP
<---
<---
<---
TR
CP
TR
-0.021
0.644
0.499
0.092
0.102
0.081
-0.186
6.075
4.741
0.853
0.000*
0.000*
*significant at p<0.05
Note: TR = trust
 LP = legitimate power
 CP = coercive power
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determined by legitimate power and coercive power. 
Findings from the analysis found that only trust has 
significant impact on the voluntary tax compliance. This 
result is similar with the findings from other researchers 
such as Wahl et al. (2010); Bukhari (2010); and Korgler 
et al. (2013). In contrast, tax compliance would not be 
influenced by any slippery slope factors. This means that 
the legitimate power and coercive power had no impact 
on either the voluntary tax compliance or the enforced 
tax compliance. This finding contrasts with the study by 
Kastlunger et al. (2013) who found the legitimate power 
and coercive power capable of influencing the voluntary tax 
compliance and enforced tax compliance. This difference 
may be due to different cultures and backgrounds of study. 
As discussed earlier, most of slippery slope studies have 
been conducted in Europe and have significant relationship 
with tax compliance in the European countries. However, 
study in Malaysia showed that trust is the only slippery 
slope factor significantly affecting tax compliance. 
 This finding indicates that if taxpayers has trust on tax 
authorities, they will voluntarily comply with the tax laws. 
However, the taxpayers do not perceive that the power 
held by the tax authorities will have an impact on their 
actions to comply with the tax system. Trust is enough to 
make taxpayers comply with the tax system on a voluntary 
basis without the use of power by the tax authorities. In 
conclusion, it is important that the Inland Revenue Board 
(IRB) as tax authorities in Malaysia to act and create a sense 
of trust among taxpayers toward IRB. This will facilitate 
the IRB to increase the level of tax compliance among 
taxpayers without severe enforcement.
 For the dynamic relationship, it is found that a dynamic 
relationship exists between trust and coercive power 
with legitimate power. Trust that exists will produce the 
impression that the tax authorities use existing powers 
with wisdom. Power used to punish tax offenders clearly 
shows that the tax authorities use enforcement efficiently 
as to detect tax evasion. These findings are more or less 
similar as discovered by Kastlunger et al. (2013). It can 
be concluded that taxpayers perceived trust and coercive 
power have been used wisely and diplomatically to detect 
and punish tax offenders. 
LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has limitation in term of low response rate 
and self-descriptions survey. The low response rate 
prevent findings to be generalized to the population of 
individual taxpayers in Malaysia. In addition, the use of a 
questionnaire to get feedback about tax compliance may 
lead to misunderstanding of the questions and the terms 
used. Moreover, tax compliance is a sensitive issue among 
taxpayers in Malaysia. Therefore, the questionnaire is 
viewed as quite difficult for respondents to understand 
and to measure the behavior of compliance as it often used 
dichotomy behavior which is compliant or non-compliant 
(Loo, Evans & McKerchar 2010).
 Future research can consider cultural impact on the 
slippery slope framework as the findings are contrary from 
other slippery slopes conducted outside Malaysia. Different 
socio-cultural scope may affect the perception of slippery 
slope. 
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